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Commentary on Reynolds v. McNichols1
Aziza Ahmed
Introduction
The 1973 case Reynolds v McNichols concerns a woman who was repeatedly arrested on
suspicion of and for “prostitution.”2 During these arrests, Roxanne Reynolds, the defendant, was
to subject to forced examination and treatment. The arrests and examinations were authorized by
Section 735 of the Revised Municipal Code of the City and County of Denver which directed the
Department of Health and Hospitals “to use every available means to ascertain the existence of
and investigate all suspected cases of communicable venereal disease, and to determine the sources
of such infections.”3 Reynolds argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was
irrational, arbitrary, and subjected Reynolds to involuntary treatment and that the ordinance
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was being applied
against female sex workers and not their male clients. Despite her compelling claims, the original
decision found for the state, holding that the acts of the state the involuntary detention and
treatment were within the police power “designed to protect public health.”4 The court tossed out
her equal protection claim, addressing it only to say that because there was no evidence that
Reynolds had actually had sex with her clients there was no reason that the men should be arrested.
In her rewritten opinion, Wendy Parmet takes a feminist lens to find for Reynolds. First,
by excavating the long history of public health law with an eye towards how this history impacts
the experiences of women, Parmet finds that arresting, detaining and treating women, and not their
male clients, is an equal protection violation. Second, through a detailed review of the probable
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment—Parmet’s rewritten decision highlights that the City
of Denver does not have probable cause to detain and arrest a person simply because she is a sex
worker. And, finally, Parmet brings in a new line of constitutional doctrine on the right to privacy.
Reynolds, decided in the same year as Roe v. Wade, provides an opportunity to reinforce how
women have the right to do what they wish with their bodies, and, in turn, emphasizes that a person
has the right to refuse treatment.
In supplementing the rewritten decision, this commentary first offers a historical
perspective on the involuntary testing and treatment of sex workers for contagious diseases
including sexually transmitted infections. It then turns to the sex worker movement, which picked
up steam in 1973, the same year as Reynolds. The sex worker movement pushed to counter
ordinances like the one used to arrest, detain, and treat Reynolds by advocating for a harmreduction approach, that would address the harms of sex work without criminalizing the people

1

This commentary draws on my prior work in Aziza Ahmed, Trafficked?: AIDS, Criminal Law, and the Politics of
Measurement, 70 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 96 (2015) and Aziza Ahmed, Feminism, Power, and Sex
Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS: Consequences for Women’s Health, 34 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND
GENDER 226-258 (2011)
2
I utilize the language of sex work in this commentary. I use the word prostitute or prostitution when I am citing or
referring to Reynolds or related legislation. This commentary also assumes that sex workers are women. While sex
workers represent a diverse range of genders, the laws discussed here specifically targeted women. Today we have
more information on the gendered and racialized profiling of sex workers that target a much wider range of
individuals.
3
Brief of the Appellees in Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (1973)
4
Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2D 1378 (1973)
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selling and buying sex. After providing this background, this commentary provides an overview
of the original decision and the feminist rewrite.
Since Reynolds, sex workers, and others advocating for less punitive approaches to
addressing STIs, have only had partial success as public health rationales continue to justify the
existence of many laws designed to detain, treat, and punish women arrested for prostitutionrelated crimes.5 The struggle for sex workers to be treated with basic respect in the context of
public health prevention programs continues today.
I.

Background

Reynolds is part of a long history of the regulation of disease through the control and
management of women’s bodies. While at different points in history many types of women have
been implicated in the management of disease, sex workers, frequently economically and socially
disenfranchised, have borne the brunt of these efforts. Drawing on secondary literature, this section
provides a brief history of the many efforts to control disease vis-à-vis the regulation of sex work.
In turn, this history places Reynolds in context -- showing how it is just one instance in a much
larger story of the control and management of women’s bodies.
From at least the mid 19th century, sex workers have long been the subject of coercive laws
to control the spread of disease. The focus on sex workers has always been contested, both by sex
workers and by advocates who felt that the targeting of sex workers discriminated against women.
An early example of the laws and the dissent that followed are the Contagious Diseases Acts
(CDAs) passed in the 1860s. The CDAs were a series of acts passed in 1864, 1866, and 1869 that
sought regulate prostitution in an effort to control disease. The CDAs applied to England and the
British Colonies. The Acts mandated check-ups for women found to be involved in prostitution.
6

7

8

Where an information on oath is laid before a justice by a superintendent of police, charging
to the effect that the informant has good cause to believe that a woman therein named is a
common prostitute . . . The justice present, on oath being made before him substantiating
the matter of the information to his satisfaction, may, if he thinks fit, order that the woman
be subject to periodical medical examinations . . . for the purpose of ascertaining at the
time of each such examination whether she is affected with a contagious disease.
Those who were found to have a venereal disease were detained at the hospital and treated.
Feminists contested the CDAs who saw the acts as oppressive. In 1869, Josephine Butler founded

9

10

5

Sienna Baskin, Aziza Ahmed, and Anna Forbes, Criminal Laws on Sex Work and HIV: A Mapping, 93 DENVER
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 355 (2016)
6
The acts applied to “military stations, garrison and seaport towns.” Margaret Hamilton, Opposition to the Contagious
Diseases Acts, 1864-1888, 10(1) Albion: A QUARTERLY JOURNAL CONCERNED WITH BRITISH STUDIES 14-27, 14
(1978)
7
The driving rationales behind the acts shifted over time and are difficult to isolate. As argued by Judith Walkowitz,
the acts may have been driven by concerns over sexuality in the Victorian period as well as venereal disease. JUDITH
WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY: WOMEN, CLASS, AND THE STATE 70 (1980). This history
offered here draws on Aziza Ahmed, Trafficked?: AIDS, Criminal Law, and the Politics of Measurement, 70
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 96 (2015)
8
The Contagious Diseases Prevention Act 1864, 27 & 28 Vict. c. 84 & 85, §§ 12–14 (U.K.).
9
The Contagious Diseases Prevention Act 1864, 27 & 28 Vict. c. 84 & 85, §§ 12–14 (U.K.).
10
This history offered here draws on Aziza Ahmed, Trafficked?: AIDS, Criminal Law, and the Politics of
Measurement, 70 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 96 (2015)
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the Ladies National Association (LNA) in Britain. The organization opposed the CDAs and
challenged the idea that women’s bodies should be regulated for public health goals. Butler
argued that like the brothel system, the CDAs exploited women’s sexuality “for the gain of men
and the state.” She and her allies felt that that medical exams were disrespectful, leaving poor
women at the mersy of the police. They had another solution: that men should remain chaste and
learn to control their sexual desires. The movement against the CDAs found important supporters.
John Stuart Mill, for example, argued that “the wives and daughters of the poor are exposed to
insufferable indignities on the suspicion of a police officer.” In her book, Codes of Misconduct:
Regulating Prostitution in Late Colonial Bombay, Ashwini Tambe describes that the CDAs went
further than all prior attempts to regulate prostitution. She writes that the CDAs in Bombay
11

12

13
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15

. . . expressed a will to control the entire population of women in prostitution, and not just
those who were responsible for public disturbances. It specified where prostitution could
be practiced, which prostitutes were acceptable, and how prostitutes could be monitored to
ensure that they were disease-free. The law made it compulsory for women to be registered
if they were going to practice prostitution anywhere.
16

The broad scale regulation of prostitution in England and the colonies came to an end due
to the intense activism of the LNA, who used media, letter-writing campaigns, and protest to argue
that women bore an unfair burden in the context of disease eradication. The CDAs were repealed
in 1888.
As Parmet highlights in her rewritten opinion, during this period linking prostitution and
disease also served as a way to control immigration in the United States. This was especially
evident in the discriminatory treatment of Chinese immigrants in the 19 century. The Page Act in
1875, for example, banned Chinese “prostitutes” from entering the United States. Women
identified as prostitutes, as argued by Professor Kerry Abrams, were seen to be “harbingers of
disease” and “moral death.” Legal challenges to the Page Act resulted in the courts legitimating
this idea. In the 1874 decision Ex Parte Ah Fook, for example, the Supreme Court of California
found that the Page Act effectuated through the quarantine and health laws of the state. With their
finding, the Court reflected broader anti-Chinese attitudes of the time. Yet, the anti-immigrant
17
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Margaret Hamilton, Opposition to the Contagious Diseases Acts, 1864-1886, 10 ALBION: A Q. J. CONCERNED WITH
BRIT. STUD. 14, 16 (1978).
12
In her book, historian Jessica Pliley describes Butler and the LNA as arguing for “reclaimability of all prostitutes,
whom she considered to be the victims of sexist circumstances and male abuse.” JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING
SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI 14 (2014).
13
Jeremy Waldron, Mill on Liberty and on the Contagious Diseases Acts, J.S. MILL’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 14 (Nadia
Urbinati & Alex Zakaras eds., 2007) (quoting Josephine Butler).
14
Id. (explaining that although there was common ground between the Christian Purity movement and Butler’s LNA,
the religious actors were motivated by the desire to protect female innocence rather than enact a feminist politics.);
see also JUDITH WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY: WOMEN, CLASS, AND THE STATE 34 (1980).
15
Id. at 16 (stating that Mill’s opposition to the Contagious Diseases Acts mandates a closer examination of Mill’s
harm principle).
16
Ashwini Tambe. CODES OF MISCONDUCT: REGULATING PROSTITUTION IN LATE COLONIAL BOMBAY (Kindle
Locations 615-617). Kindle Edition.
17
Id at 31.
18
Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration, 105 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 642
(2005)
19
Ex Parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402 (1874)
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sentiment manifesting through public health efforts would also be curtailed by the courts. As
Parmet’s rewritten opinion highlights that, one of the most important of these cases, Jew Ho v.
Williamson, found that attempts to protect the public from communicable diseases “does not
justify the discriminatory application of highly coercive and intrusive public health measures.”
In his comprehensive history, No Magic Bullet, historian Allan Brandt shows that
eugenicists tied venereal disease to the future of a superior race. They fixated on prostitution as
the primary way in which venereal disease was being spread. Estimates provided by experts at the
time placed rates of venereal disease among prostitutes as over 70% in most cases. A key
understanding emerged from this: that some women were good, pure, and innocent; while others
were bad, impure, and sensual. Most major cities had “red light districts,” often closely monitored
by the police and city officials, but “purity crusaders” were able to galvanize fears of venereal
disease to begin to close down these areas. Focused on disease, in 1905, progressive reformers and
physicians decided that to end the spread of sexually transmitted infections required the “complete
repression of prostitution.” The movement to end prostitution merged with a larger narrative at
the time: that of “white slavery” -- the idea that young white women were being lured into
prostitution. By 1910, Congress passed the Mann Act aimed at curbing the purported prostitution
of White women. Though the Mann Act reflected the idea that women selling sex were victims
of trickery, by channeling resources towards law enforcement, it continued to facilitate a punitive
approach to sex work. At the state level, the Inferior Courts Act passed by the New York State
Legislature also aimed to end the spread of disease by focusing on prostitutes. The law provided
for medical examination and mandatory treatment of women found guilty of soliciting. The law
did not require a man (or a male client) to be treated. Progressive-era reformers known as social
hygencists were supportive of the eradication of prostitution on moral and health grounds and
agreed all prostitutes should be tested and treated for disease. They were not willing to accept,
however, that only women should the target of these laws. Women, unlike men, were being
punished for spreading disease, while men largely escaped punishment.
The goal of shutting down red light districts was also wrapped up in the idea that American
troops would perform poorly during World War I if they contracted STIs. In turn, efforts to end
the spread of venereal disease shifted towards protecting the health of the soldier. This largely
meant that red-light districts near military bases were closed and that prostitutes were asked to
leave town. New laws were passed which criminalized prostitution when the woman was infected
with an STI. Empowered by the Mann Act as well as state and city efforts, law enforcement
cracked down on women selling sex. These crackdowns, however, did not result in a slowing of
STI transmission. To the contrary, they had little effect on the incidence of STIs, and as some data
suggests by the end of World War I, huge numbers of men in the Army carried an STI.
As time passed, advocates shifted the debate on STIs. By the 1930s, successful crusaders
sought to fight the battle against sexually transmitted infections, not on grounds of sexual morality,
but on the basis of science and medicine. Still, the idea that only some people were prone to STIs
20
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Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F.10 (1900)
Parmet rewritten opinion
22
Allan Brandt, NO MAGIC BULLET (1985) at 19.
23
Id. at 31
24
Id. at 35
25
For a critical history of the Mann Act see JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE
MAKING OF THE FBI 13 (2014).
26
Id. at 37
27
Id. at 74-75
21
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-- racial minorities, the poor, and the immoral – continued to shape the public health response to
STIs.
The World War II period saw a repeat of the patterns before it: the stigmatization of sex
workers for the sake of protecting soldiers. Again, crackdowns on red light districts near military
bases served as a key way to regulate the spread of STIs. In New York, women arrested for
prostitution were subject to mandatory testing, treatment, and detention. The fact that these
measures, including the imprisonment of many sex workers, did not lead to a reduction in STIs led
public health officials to conclude that it was not only prostitutes but “loose” women that were
harming soldiers. The discovery of penicillin offered some relief to the many people diagnosed
with STIs and aided in reducing the rates of STIs for a short period. By the 1960s and 1970s,
however, STI transmission was once again on the rise.
Reynolds was decided in 1973 during the broader STI resurgence. The language of the
Denver Municipal Ordinance, designed to control the spread of STIs, bears remarkable similarity
to the language of the 18[69] CDA. The ordinance defines the persons who may be “reasonably
suspected to have a venereal disease”:
28

29

30

31

Any person who is arrested and charged in the municipal court of the city and county or
any other court in the city and county with an offense in the nature of or involving vagrancy,
prostitution. A violation of that article or any offense related to sex and any person
convicted of any such offense in the city and county . . .
. . . every suspected person detained in jail . . . shall be examined by the department of
health and hospitals for the purpose of determining whether or not such person is, in fact,
infected with a communicable venereal disease.
In other words, as during every major period before it, regulating prostitution became central to
controlling the spread of disease.
By 1973, however, sex workers in the United States had begun to organize. In 1973,
Margo St. James founded the organization Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics (“COYOTE”) in San
Francisco. Together with the Italian Committee for the Civil Rights of Prostitutes founded in 1982,
and the English Collective of Prostitutes in England founded in 1975, sex workers began to
organize around the world. Sex workers held two World Whores Congresses, in 1985 and 1986,
resulting in the World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights—one of the first charters of its kind—calling
for a decriminalization of “all aspects of adult prostitution resulting from individual decision.”
32
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34

35

28

Id. at 158
Id. at 34
30
Id. at 167
31
Id. at 168
32
This history of sex worker organizing draws on my prior article Aziza Ahmed, Feminism, Power, and Sex Work in
the Context of HIV/AIDS: Consequences for Women’s Health, 34 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 226-258
(2011)
33
Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezma, Introduction in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND
REDEFINITION 19 (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998)
34
Gail Pheterson, Not Repeating History, in A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WHORES 3 (Gail Pheterson ed.,
1989).
35
Jo Doezema, Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary v. Forced Prostitution Dichotomy, in GLOBAL SEX
WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION 34, 37 (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema, eds., 1998).
29
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Unlike the punitive mandatory testing and treatment regimes, sex workers called for
policies based on harm-reduction. In essence, harm-reduction is an effort not to eliminate an act
(like selling sex) but instead to address the myriad harms that can be implicated in the unsafe sale
of sex. Key to the harm-reduction model is the decriminalization of the purchase and sale of sex.
In drawing on harm-reduction, sex workers drew from a growing public health framing, which
originated in the Netherlands in the 1970s challenging the punitive abolitionist perspective and
arguing for decreasing the harms faced by sex workers in the course of selling sex. Focusing
primarily on drug use, a broad-based alliance joined sex workers in advocating for harm-reduction,
including physicians, activists, and public health officials. The AIDS epidemic in the 1980s
provided further incentive to continue to think creatively—and from a harm-reduction
perspective—about how to appropriately address epidemics. AIDS provided legitimacy to the
harm-reduction approach and by the 1990s became widely accepted as the most effective means
to address the harms associated with drug use and sex work including the spread of HIV.
Despite wide-scale support from public health experts and affected communities, harmreduction gained some political traction but could not unseat the reigning abolitionist approach
that dominates the response to drug use, sex work, and addiction. The abolitionist focus mapped
onto the broader push to utilize criminal law and criminal law-like methods (including detention
and treatment) to address the spread of STIs including HIV and AIDS.
36

37

II. The Original Decision
The Reynolds decision is illustrative of the punitive way in which we did and continue to
treat sex workers in the context of addressing the spread of sexually transmitted infections.
Roxanne Reynolds was arrested under a Municipal Ordinance which allowed police to “hold and
treat” women arrested for prostitution. Reynolds was twenty-seven years old and, according to the
decision, described herself as a “model and a prostitute.” Her first arrest occurred in 1970. She
was found by police in a hotel room and admitted at trial that she had been paid to have sex with
the man she was found with. Although no sexual activity had taken place, the plaintiff was arrested
and placed in the city jail. She was charged with solicitation and prostitution. Reynolds was given
a “deferred prosecution” which allowed her to be released without having to plead guilty or not,
and the charges were dismissed. In May and July 1971, she was told that she had to report to the
Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) because she had been soliciting acts of prostitution.
While at the DHH she was examined for STIs. On the first visit in May she was found to have
gonorrhea and was then treated for it. The second visit did not show a positive result for STIs. On
her third order to arrive at DHH, Reynolds arrived with a lawyer and refused to be examined.
In June 1972, Reynolds was arrested again in a hotel room. Although she was arrested for
prostitution, she argued that a final agreement for sexual exchange had not yet been reached. When
she was placed in jail she was given the option of being held for 48 hours and then examined and
38

36

Diane Riley and Pat O’Hare, Harm Reduction: History, Definition, Practice in HARM REDUCTION NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1-3 (eds. James Inciardi and Lana Harrison 1999). (arguing that harm-reduction
emerged from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and North America). See, also, Michael T. Wright, Harm
Reduction, THE BODY (1998), http://www.thebody.com/content/art14023.html. For a general take on harm reduction
see, Scott Burris, Response, Harm Reduction's First Principle: "The Opposite of Hatred", 15 INT'L J. DRUG POL'Y 243,
243 (2004).
37
Melissa Hope Ditmore, WHEN SEX WORK AND DRUG USE OVERLAP: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADVOCACY AND
PRACTICE (2013) at 9.
38
Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2D 1378 (1973)
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treated or being treated without knowledge of whether or not she had an STI. She chose to be
released with medication.
Relying on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Reynolds argued that the ordinance
was unconstitutional and, alternatively, argued that even if constitutional on its face, it was
unconstitutional as it was applied to her. She argued first, that the ordinance allowed for
involuntary detention, examination, and treatment, which were each a violation of her Fourteenth
Amendment right to be secure in her person. Second, she argued that there was no clear class of
persons to whom police were to apply the ordinance and thus the ordinance lacked adequate
guidelines. Third, she argued that the option to leave after taking penicillin under threat of jail time
otherwise resulted in an unconstitutional coercion of the person and an invasion of her right to
privacy. Fourth, she argued that it was not accepted medical practice to treat someone for a
condition without examining them first and, finally, that the ordinance was only applied to women
which violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The 10 Circuit, in keeping with the long history of detaining sex workers for the sake of
controlling disease, found that it is within the city’s purview to profile sex workers as sites of STIs
stating that “[p]rostitution and venereal disease are no strangers”.
Having established that sex workers are an appropriate target of punitive efforts to control
the spread of STIs, the court turns to the authority of the city to enact such an ordinance. The court
finds that the ordinance’s requirement of involuntary detention, of examination for an STI during
the detention, and treatment of the person is constitutional. The court of appeals drives home this
point by highlighting that the Supreme Court has found that the police power of the states to
vaccinate and quarantine individuals constitutional. In turn, the 10 circuit finds that limited
detention in jail without bond “for the purpose of examination and treatment for a venereal disease
for the purpose of involuntary examination and treatment” are valid under the police power.
Finding that that involuntary detention, examination and treatment were valid under the police
power, the court then easily concluded that the law was not unconstitutionally applied to
Reynolds.
The court threw out the equal protection claim that the ordinance was only being applied
to women. The court found that it was not significant that Reynolds’s clients were not arrested.
And, despite the fact that no sex was exchanged for money, the court ignored the obvious problem
that only Reynolds was arrested and tested and the men were not. The court concluded that it is
the prostitute that is the “primary source of venereal disease.”
39
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41

th
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II.

Feminist Judgment

Unlike the original opinion, which dismisses the Equal Protection Claim, Parmet’s feminist
rewrite takes seriously the idea that Reynolds was experiencing a violation due to the selective
targeting under Section 735 on the basis of sex. Parmet places the Reynolds case in line with a thenew line of cases including Reed v. Reed decided only two years before Reynolds. Following
Reed, the rewritten opinion holds that although Section 735 does not facially discriminate on the
44

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
40
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basis of sex, Reynolds convincingly shows that the ordinance was being applied unequally to
women. This was particularly true because the men with whom she had sex could have had an STI
which could have been transmitted to her but are ignored in this public health response to STIs.
Turning to cases in the context of public health that specifically grapple with discrimination during
in the late 19 and early 20 century, Parmet highlights that the protection of public health cannot
result in the discriminatory application of “highly coercive and intrusive public health measures.”
Because there is no reason to believe that women are especially prone to spreading STIs, Parmet
concludes that the focus on women to the exclusion of men can actually undermine the public
health program. Most obviously this happens when female sex workers contract STIs from their
male clients making the clients just ask likely to be the “source” of disease. The focus on women
is discriminatory.
Parmet’s opinion which has the effect of protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of women
who sell sex, also finds Fourth Amendment violations in the failure to obtain a warrant before
forcing a woman to submit to a medical examination or remain in detention. Citing to Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, Parmet acknowledges that the state has wide latitude to act in the context of
protecting the public from communicable diseases, but notes that it is still necessary to get a
warrant before performing routing health and safety searches. While Parmet acknowledges that
individual rights may give way to state efforts to protect the public health, she emphasizes that
public health exceptions to civil rights and civil liberties are limited in scope to situations in which
there is an emergency. Finding warrants to be necessary calls for a discussion of probable cause.
But probable cause requires individualized review, and as Parmet highlights, the broad
assumptions of the ordinance including that anyone who is “reasonably suspected to have had
contact with another individual reasonably believed to have had a communicable venereal disease”
will transmit a disease to others. The broad approach taken by 735 is far from an individualized
review. And, even if the court takes seriously that it must defer to the legislature for defining the
targeted class of people, Parmet finds that the higher rates of gonorrhea in the sex work community
do not justify the targeting of sex workers as though they all have an STI.
As the feminist rewrite highlights, Section 735 further authorizes a compulsory examination
of those who have been arrested for prostitution and the class of people also includes those charged
with vagrancy. This lacks any basis in law. As a 1921 decision relied on by Parmet, Ex Parte
Arata points out, the mere fact that a person is suspected of prostitution is “insufficient to establish
probable cause that she is infected with a venereal disease.”
Finally, drawing on a line of cases on the right to privacy including Griswold v.
Connecticut in 1964 and Roe v Wade in 1973, Parmet holds that coercing a woman to accept
treatment without consent or diagnosis, violates her right to privacy. Instead, Parmet holds that
informed consent must govern the treatment of people for STIs. Guided by informed consent,
patients would receive all information relevant to their treatment and would be able to exert control
over their own bodies. As Parmet holds, there should not be an exception for sex workers.
th

th
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Conclusion
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Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
Ex Parte Arata, 198 P. 814 (1921)
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
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The regulation of women’s bodies has long been a part of the management and control of
disease. The Reynolds case represents a moment in which one woman impacted by the law
attempted to push back on existing legislation to protect her civil rights and civil liberties. While
she lost her case, Parmet’s feminist rewrite takes seriously the discriminatory impact of Section
735 against women and protects the civil rights and civil liberties of those targeted by the
ordinance. The failure to protect the civil liberties and civil rights of sex workers had broad effect
in the coming decades as HIV began to spread among sex workers and others. As epidemiological
evidence now demonstrates, a less punitive approach, one that respected basic civil rights and civil
liberties, and enabled better access of public health programs, would have been a more effective
method of stopping the spread of HIV and ensuring greater access to treatment and discrimination.
Reynolds failed to set the stage for this approach to a public health response and contributed to the
failure of the United States to appropriately address HIV. A feminist decision, like Parmet’s, could
have altered the legal landscape on addressing STIs and sex work away from a punitive approach
to sex work and STIs and towards a more effective and less stigmatizing harm-reduction approach.
In doing so, the rewritten decision would not only have benefitted the women targeted by the
ordinance, but would likely have improved public health outcomes without coercion and
discrimination.
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